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RCM - Reliability
Centered Maintenance
RCM Synopsis:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_centered_maintenance
The recognition of Reliability Centered Maintenance as a key component of any
maintenance effort was significant. RCM offered a formal technique to examine a
machine's need for maintenance that was not a time-based method. Up until the
1960s the Naval Aviation maintenance community would bring an aircraft in for
its annual inspection (Time based) and open every panel, test every cable, cycle
every system, check temperatures and pressures, put it all back together again
and test fly it. Often, it would have a mechanical failure on the test hop.

Naval Aviation searched for a solution and found that the probability of
failure of a component had almost nothing to do with specific points on a
calendar. Time based inspections did and does have a good place in Naval
Aviation maintenance. Time based inspections are still in place today at every
level with monthly, annual, and component specific inspections. However, the
vast majority of component failures simply failed between these inspections.
The Navy addressed the problem by increasing the training of all associated
with aircraft maintenance so that each person associated with an aircraft had
enough knowledge to recognized a pending failure early and stop the process of
an accident chain. Training for all aircraft maintenance people was increased.
Fueling crews, LOX service crews, weapons personnel, air traffic controllers
were included in the improved early detection and early intervention program.
However, the focus of the best training went to improving the training crew
chiefs and aviators were given in understanding the effects of maintenance
problems on the aircraft during flight.

Procedures were changed to get each member of the flight team every
opportunity to break the accident chain. Every cycle of flight got specific
training to recognize potential mechanical and procedural failures that could
result in a breakdown or an accident. Now the crew chief pre-flights the
aircraft. The aviator pre-flights the aircraft just before flying. The crew of
the aircraft performs extensive post start inspections to check for leaks,
smells, or noises. The pilot conducts a pre-taxi checklist to check system
integrity. The pilot performs a pre-takeoff checklist to assure all is working
properly. The pilot performs a pre-takeoff engine run-up to test the operating
efficiency of the engine and all controls. Then, when all has been checked, the
aviator takes off. Then the aviator conducts a post takeoff checklist, a climb
checklist, a cruise checklist, a descent checklist, a landing checklist, a post
landing checklist, a shutdown checklist, a post shutdown checklist, a post
flight inspection, and a detailed maintenance write-up by the aviator.
Each checklist reminds the aviator to compare where they are in the flight
with a set of operating temperatures and pressures to know the condition of
their mechanical systems. But that was not all.
They were given a manual for the aircraft called a NATOPS Manual (Naval
Aviation Training & Operational Procedures & Standardization Manual) with the
operating instructions and emergency procedures if a system failure occurred.
The NATOPS Manual was about three inches thick and each crew member associated
with an aircraft had to know their Emergency Procedures cold! To fail the
Emergency Procedures Test was to be grounded.
Instituting the NATOPS Manual added knowledge and standard procedures to
Naval Aviation and the results were remarkable. Now the aviator and the crew had
enough knowledge to recognize pending failures early and act in such a way to
manage the event safely with proven information from test pilots. If certain
operational or mechanical events were unfolding, the crew were given permission
to terminate the mission and get the aircraft safely on the ground with no
questions asked. I was a Marine Corps aviator during that time an I saw it all
happen.
In today's business operating environment, we are using RCM to create "Early
Detection" and "Early Intervention" to accomplish what Naval Aviation did in the
'60s and '70s but several things stand in the way of a successful
implementation.
Total System Integration & Knowledge - NAVAIRSYSCOM (Naval
Aviation Air System Command) had the resources and authority to totally
integrate the operations and maintenance functions for Naval Aviation. They
could "make things happen".

If you consider a drilling rig today, it is a collection of systems and
subsystems made by widely ranging special vendors that is bolted together to do
a special task. Few drilling and operating companies have something similar to
NATOPS to standardize the operations and maintenance required to economically
and safely drill a well.
What Training is Offered - If a drilling company does not have
a set of procedures to codify how to run the rig, how can it train? Technology
is offering us a way to accumulate knowledge and share it in an almost
effortless manner, yet this capability is rejected almost daily.
Training Time - Training in the mechanical operation and safe
operating procedures seems to be difficult accomplish. Usually the limiting
factor for training is when to do it. Today, there are breakthroughs in how to
get more knowledge to workers with higher retention in less time than ever
before in history yet we are still bound by the traditional methods offered by
schools.
"Sit 'em in a classroom for an hour a subject for half a day. That's the
way we always done it." ~ Anon
Wealth is created or lost at the point of work. Technology is offering
us ways to get the right decision making information to the worker at the point
of work in ways never imagined 20 years ago and yet we are still training the
way we did 40 years ago.
Training Money - The funding for O&M (operations & Maintenance)
training almost always lags behind the functional demand for knowledge. The ROI
for training in mechanical awareness for operators is usually in 40:1 to 60:1
range.
Here is a couple of number to consider. 8% of all machine operators
are directly responsible for 60% of all maintenance costs. Because of
operational tempo, production pressure, mechanical ignorance, or disregard for
their safety or others they will over speed, over temp, over pressure, drag,
bump, impact, or operate a machine to destruction.
4% of these operators simply do not know that they are causing the damage and
30% of your maintenance spending can be recouped through training.
The remaining 4% are simply taking careless short cuts that cripple the
company. Half of these would rather change their ways than lose their jobs and
will change.
The final 2% simply do not care and will continue their unsafe and
unprofitable operating habits until they get fired or get somebody hurt.
Training and testing will identify these people and the return on investment
is huge when the 8% are identified, trained, or fired.
What is Needed to Make RCM Work? - To make RCM work you have to
have a trained operator that can operate a machine properly, recognize a pending
failure (Early detection) and then be authorized to stop the process (Early
Intervention) to prevent a breakdown or accident. If management is not willing
to standup to this test, RCM will not work.
All of the money in the world spent on preventive, predictive, and preemptive
maintenance is no match for ignorance at the controls.
The US Navy learned that training and the resultant decision making will
produce more missions with fewer accidents at a lower cost than doing nothing.
American industry needs to examine this successful model for more profitable
operations.
If you should care to discus any of the comments made in this article, I am
at your service.
David Geaslin
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